A comparative study of the theory and practice of terror by Eddy, Eleanor Madeleine.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TERROR
by 'f*<P$f>-
ELEANOR MADELEINE EDDY
A.B., Mount Holyoke College, 1956
A MASTER'S REPORT
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1968
Approved by:
Major JO-ofessor
LD
lUf
C 2-
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION j
SOVIET TERROR 2
NAZI TERROR 2h
SOME COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS Mt
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ^
8
INTRODUCTION
The word "totalitarian" was created In the twentieth century
to describe a new and unique form of government. The old Idea of
autocracy or dictatorship did not adequately describe the type of
rule found In Na2i Germany or Stalinist Russia. The revolution
in technology, particularly in the fields of transportation and
communication, permitted a degree of control not possible under
the old Tsarist or Prussian autocracy. With the technological
changes came a new theoretical basis for loyalty. Margret Boverl
has successfully described this move from allegiance to the nation
state to loyalty to the Ideology. 1 An Individual In the present
century is expected to totally adhere to one Ideology whether It
be Fascism, Communism or democracy, and If he should shift his
allegiance from one to another, he is considered a traitor to the
cause. This new requirement is especially obvious In totalitar-
ian countries where the demand for conformity Is absolute, but
it can also be observed at times In democratic nations. The post
war treason trials were based to a certain extent on this prin-
ciple, as were the Investigations and innuendos of the McCarthy
Era in America.
Within this theoretical formulation totalitarianism has been
described as unique, because it alone enforces uniformity through
a secret police system of terror. Individuals are guilty of
treason without having acted against the state." A disloyal
thought or association with a group that is considered potentially
1Treason In the Twentieth Century . (New Y0r it t 1961),. Part I.
a threat by the leadership is sufficient for arrest, Imprison-
ment or even death. Through denunciation, a network of spies,
and arbitrary arrest the Secret Police create an atmosphere of
fear that Is sufficient to forestall any Incipient opposition,
thereby ensuring through terror the theoretical loyalty of the
populace. Thus a new definition of treason provides the Ideo-
logical Justification for a system of terror.
This whole concept of treason and terror has generally been
applied to two twentieth century regimes considered totalitarian
— Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. They, more obviously than
any others, fit the totalitarian concept with their demands for
absolute loyalty to an Ideology that applies to all areas of
life, and their system of terroristic police control. Several
works have been written describing the governmental and party
system of one or the other, but books of comparison on specific
aspects of their society have been rare. A comparative study
of the system and practice of terror in Stalinist Russia and
Nasi Germany can shed some light on the validity of generali-
zation about terror and thereby the whole concept of totali-
tarianism.
SOVIET TERROR
From 1936 to 1938 the Western world was astonished at the
public trial and conviction of a leading group of Russian Bolshe-
viks for treason. As the situation became clearer, It was
established that the public trials were merely an outward mani-
festation of a Great Purge that probably claimed the lives or
led to the arrest of millions. Lack of documentary evidence on
the reason for this terror led to the formulation of various
explanations, some relating specifically to the Russian situation,
others more general statements about the function of terror in
totalitarian government. While the ideas of scholars vary as to
the purpose of the purge, there is agreement that its victims
were by and large not guilty of treason in the traditional sense.
However, since so many victims (the overwhelming majority) were
charged with some kind of hostile activity against the Soviet
state, perhaps a new definition of treason is warranted. An
investigation of terror and the purge in Russia may help to
clarify the situation and re-define the term "treason" so that
it has some meaning and relevance in Soviet History.
Terror began in Soviet Russia almost immediately after the
Bolshevik Revolution. On December 20, 1917 the Council of
People's Commissars appointed Feliks DzerShinski the head of a
new security agency, commonly known as the Cheka, to deal with
counter-revolutionary activity. 1 From the beginning the Cheka
was responsible only to the party leadership, and it never lost
this high degree of autonomy. Initially the Secret Police hunted
and arrested enemies of the state, but by the summer of 1918
with the Civil War underway and an attempt on Lenin's life,
terror against the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries became its
avowed policy. Lenin defended its excesses i The Cheka, he said,
*For a brief history of the Secret Police 1917-1956 see,
Simon Wolin and Robert S. Slusser eds., The Soviet Secret Police.(Hew York, 1957), Part I. ~~~
Is "...putting into practice the dictatorship of the proletariat,
and in this respect Its role is invaluable, there is no other
path to the freeing of the masses than the suppression of the
exploiters by force."2 By 1922 and the change of its name (GPU
and in 1923 OGPU) the Secret Police had infiltrated many areas of
Soviet life. Its first duty was still the suppression of counter-
revolutionary acts, but it now also supervised the railroads and
waterways, guarded the frontier, maintained its own army, had
representatives in the Regular Army, and carried on espionage
work. By the end of the twenties and the consolidation of Stalin's
power, no area of life in the Soviet Onion whether cultural, po-
litical or economic was free from the scrutiny of the police.
There were no laws to curb its power, its responsibility was
strictly and solely to the Party leadership, represented first
by the Politbureau and later by Stalin alone. The Secret Police
because of its autonomy became almost a state within a state,
with its own hierachy and ruling group, but more important, it
became the tool of the leadership, the instrument of terror, the
hated and feared symbol of Soviet totalitarianism.
Terror in the history of the Soviet Union seems to divide
into two distinct phases, one before the assassination of Kirov
in 193^, the other after.* While any periodization is somewhat
2nd edTTTxhS; p'. $£&?r~ T,X' Lenln ' Sochin°nlT» <«»*>.
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"Jd *!SP logically be made around the year1930 as Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism argues,
one chooses 1930 as the beginning of totalitarianism in Soviet
Russia when the leadership began to use terror to atomize society.
However, the evidence indicates that Stalin did not decide until
the Kirov assassination to completely overturn the leadership
structure that culminated in the Great Purge.
artificial and obviously not absolute, there are differences in
the two eras that make It useful. For instance, the early terror
appears to have been directed primarily at groups hostile to the
Bolshevik regime while in the later period almost the entire,
ruling group was dispossessed. Furthermore during the early phase,
reprisals generally took the form of arrests, exiles, sentences
to slave labor camps etc., while during the later period executions
were widespread. A perplexing difference In the two phases con-
cerns the strength of the leadership. By 1931* the Bolshevik
leadership appeared to have stabilized its control and eliminated
the opponents of the regime, yet the terror unleashed in the
second phase was so intense that it made the reprisals of the
first era seem almost insignificant by comparison. It is the
later period known as the Great Purge that has so puzzled the
Western World, but It would be a mistake to consider it alone.
Terror is terror whether mild or intense, and it has always been
a tool of Soviet totalitarianism. Moreover there Is definitely
a relationship If not an identity in purpose behind the purge in
the two periods despite the difference in scope.
A theoretical analysis of the Russian purge must begin with
a brief description of its history. In the Soviet past it is
difficult to differentiate purge and terror. Brzezinskl main-
tains that the two were separate though closely connected phe-
nomena that "coalesced" in the Mass Purge of 1937-38. In this
sense he asserts that terror was applied to the population and
the purge to the party and administrative apparatus. 3 This
1956)^ch?
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The Permanent P,^ (Cambridge, Mass.,
seems to be an unnecessary division. If the purge is described
as a cleansing process in Soviet history, it certainly applies
equally to society and the party who were both in this sense
purified. Furthermore to discuss the purge as separate from
terror is not logical. The purge by its very purpose terrorises.
The object of the elimination of certain officials either from
the power structure or society is partly to remove individuals
who might pose a threat to the existence of the regime, but it
is also designed to create an atmosphere of fear that would fore-
stall any grouping together of discontented elements. To be
expelled from the party as was common in the early days while it
obviously did not inspire the terror of the 1937-38 era, still
promoted insecurity about the future, fear of the Secret Police,
uneasiness about employment possibilities etc. To be an expelled
member of the party in the Soviet Onion could not have been com-
fortable, and to say that this type of purge was not a form of
terror seems illogical. Brzezlnski further states that the purge
was only practiced against groups that arose within the totali-
tarian state. For instance he states that the Kulaks were
exterminated not purged, because they had been earmarked for
elimination from the beginning. Again this is a somewhat arti-
ficial distinction. If the purge cleansed the party by elimi-
nating the stagnant or opportunist elements because they no
longer lent vitality to the group, it is surely the same process
when the Kulaks are eliminated because society needs to be
^Ibld .. p. 26.
purified from contaminating influences. * Thus purge and terror
apply to both society and the party, and together are an import-
ant element of Soviet totalitarianism.
By defining the purge as a cleansing of both society and/or
the power structure, the early terror of the Civil War era clearly
is part of the general picture. Both during the war and from 1922
to approximately 1929, the Secret Police worked at eliminating
opposition or counter-revolutionary groups from society. At the
same time the party periodically eliminated the passive, the
unreliable, the self-seekers and the heretics. 5 in this period
neither the population nor the party were terrorised to any great
degree. Expulsion did not necessarily mean arrest and the popu-
lation in general felt relatively secure as long as they were not
openly opposing the regime. Many authors have quite correctly
shown that up to 1929 while the regime was authoritarian, it was
not totalitarian. Lenin was not a dictator in the sense that
Stalin was, and the leadership had not yet developed the absolute
monopoly of power that is characteristic of totalitarianism. By
1929, however, the situation changed radically. Stalin had emerg-
ed triumphant from the succession struggle following Lenin's
death, and a new class of Soviet educated technicians and special-
ists was emerging. Moreover the government was embarking on a
new scheme to Industrialize and collectivize Russian society that
A simple definition of terror as any act of the state
designed to create fear, and purge as a means of promoting terror,
resolves the semantic difficulty.
'Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule . (Cambridge. Mass..
1958). p. 210. ' '
8necessitated the full support of the ruling group. Many of the
scientific and technical Intelligentsia, originally encouraged by
the regime, were arrested, forced to confess, sometimes released
if they had been sufficiently demoralized, often sentenced to
labor camps. At the same time the party was purged of all those
who opposed Stalin's economic policies. 7 Tatiana Tchernavin
categorized the women she met in prison at this time. The largest
group consisted of wives of the Intelligentsia (her own husband,
a scientist who had worked for the Soviets, was also in prison),
next were women who had been abroad since the Revolution or had
applied for a passport or dealt with foreigners, third were
religious women (either nuns or particularly pious individuals),
and last were the criminals who comprised only lOJf of the total.
*
This is clearly the beginning of the identification of hostlles
by their social or economic origin that was so much a part of the
Great Purge. The same type of Identification was taking place
within the party. The Trotskyltes were identified as hostile
supposedly because they espoused permanent revolution and demo-
cratic centralism, 9 and the followers of Bukharln became counter-
°F. Beck and W. Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction of
Confession
. (London, 1951), p. 16-17.
7Falnsod, p. 211.
tatiana Tchernavin, Escape from the Soviets . (New York,
1931*), 119f.
"it is difficult in the case of Trotsky and his followers todetermine how much Stalin was motivated by personal jealousy and
revenge, and how much by opposition to the ideas of the group,
garticularly since Stalin incorporated many of their ideas intois own program. The personal motive was probably strongest inthe case of Trotsky, but both played a part In his banishment andthe Identification of his group as enemies of the state. Also to
pe considered is Stalin's manipulation of the group and theirideas in his drive for power.
revolutionary or deviationlst because they favored a slower, less
harsh collectivilization. This is also the period narked by the
expulsion, recantation, and restoration of many old Bolsheviks
including Kamenev and Zinoviev who were to become the principle
defendents in the 1936 public trial.
This particular phase of the purge (the elimination of the
pre-revolutionary Intelligentsia and the silencing of leading
oppositionists within the party) lasted until approximately 193>f
and the Kirov assassination. The facts concerning the murder
are obscure. Kirov, supposedly a liberal in the ruling elite and
director of party activities in Leningrad was assassinated in
December 1931* allegedly by a disillusioned Bolshevik. Whether
Stalin planned the murder as an excuse to launch the terror on
the populace and party, or whether the death of one of his favor-
ites convinced him that he had to permanently eliminate the
opposition, is unclear. In either case the intensity and scope
of the purge and terror increased gradually after this event
culminating in the bloodbath of 1937-38. At this point the sum-
mary death sentence reappeared, it became the duty of individuals
to denounce relatives and measures against families of the accused
were legalised. 10 With a cry for increased vigilance to safe-
guard the revolution, the party required each individual to
publicly denounce his acquaintances. 11 People were accused of
having an anti-Soviet attitude, supporting hostile elements,
10Beck and Godin, p. 28-29.
l:LBeck and Godin, p. 29, reported that 100 denunciations were
necessary to establish a person's vigilance.
10
collaborating or having relations with the enemy, loss of class
vigilance, distorting the party line and devlatlonlsm In general. 12
These charges were put forth at meetings of the party cells, In
the factories, the schools until they became a part of every phase
of Soviet life. Arrests did not necessarily follow (especially
in the early 193^-36 stage), but since the agents of the NKVD
were everywhere they soon had accumulated a dossier on every
citizen. By 1938 no Individual was safe, and while it is impos-
sible to determine how many people were arrested, It is certain
that the figure rose into the millions. The Army, the national-
ity groups, the administrative personnel both economic and poli-
tical, and the party were purged indiscriminately of all persons
allegedly hostile to the leadership. By 1939 and the end of the
Great Purge, the leadership group in every area of society had
been almost completely dispossessed.
Bewilderment Is one of the first reactions to a study of
the purge. What could possibly be the purpose behind the dell-
berate elimination of so many individuals, especially those in
key positions. That such a widespread conspiracy could have
existed in a regime so outwardly stable Is difficult to believe.
That leading Bolsheviks could have been allied for years with
Nazi or Japanese agents as the prosecution charged, is equally
unacceptable to any observer of Russian history. *3 That millions
12Beck and Godin, p. 29-30.
^Trotsky somewhat pathetically tried to prove his innocence
and discredit the prosecution in the public trials, though the
complete irrationality of the accusations made his attempt futile.
See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast . (New York, 1965).
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of people could have been so hostile to the regime that they
were prepared to commit treason and yet were successfully elimi-
nate'! without threatening the existence of the leadership is
hardly credible. There are obvious pitfalls in any attempt to
find a rationale behind such an apparently irrational process,
yet many theories have been formulated to explain either the
function of terror under totalitarianism or the specific reason
for the Russian purge. While it is impossible to discuss them
all (Beck and Godln, for instance, mention seventeen different
theories that were postulated by inmates of the HKVD prisons In
1937-33) « there are a few that merit special attention because
of the light they shed on this apparently Irrational phenomenon.
One type of analysis describes the purge as a necessary and
permanent function of totalitarianism in general. Called the
"Theory of Social Supply" by Beck and Godln and forming the
major thesis of Zblgniew Brxezinskl's book The Permanent Puree ,
this theory asserts that the "cleansing" process is essential
for mobility within the totalitarian ruling group. Only by
constantly infusing new blood into the movement can the revolu-
tionary seal of the system be maintained. According to Beck
and Godin by the thirties a bureaucratic caste of officials had
emerged In the Soviet Union that aspired to become a hereditary
ruling class. The leadership, sensing a threat to its own
security, therefore liquidated Its membership, replacing it with
newly educated bureaucrats from the population. 1 Because the
xSeck and Godin, p. 221.
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Communist Ideology stresses the need for progress with continuous
striving toward new goals, only by eliminating the stagnant,
opportunist and oppositionist elements from the administrative
apparatus, can the movement continue Its forward momentum thereby
justifying Its own existence. The constant reshuffling of person-
nel prevents rigid power lines from developing and promotes
mobility within the system and an Instability that Insures the
stability of the top echelon. * The purging process Is therefore
permanent, primarily because It satisfies the needs of totali-
tarianism, but also because it eliminates the minority that is
unable to adapt to this type of rule.
Another analysis that is related to the Social Mobility
theory in the sense that it ascribes to the necessity of terror
under totalitarianism, is one formulated by Hannah Arendt that
might be called the Atomizatlon Theory. Describing totalitarian
governments in general terms Arendt asserts that "...their most
consplclous external characteristic Is their demand for total,
unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the
individual member."16 This type of loyalty is achieved via
terror and especially the system of denunciation that accompanies
the purge. For Instance, under Soviet totalitarianism no indi-
vidual could feel safe in expressing his thoughts to another,
no matter how close the friendship or the family relationship,
since it was the duty of every citizen to spy on all his
^'Brzezlnski, p. 30.
l6Hannah Arendt, The OrlElns of Totalitarianism . (New York.
1951). p. 316.
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acquaintances. This system of citizen spying became so wide-
spread during the Great Purge that each Individual became In a
sense the agent provocateur of everyone else. As a result of
this type of terror society became atomized, each Individual
became Isolated. No personal or group relationships could be
formed for fear that the chance remark or the misreading of
one's thoughts would be reported to the Secret Police. Since
Individuals were required to denounce others, even the knowledge
of another's existence might lead to a completely fabricated
denunciation, so most people tried to be as Inconspicuous as
possible and as remote from others as his particular circumstance
would allow. Unable to ally with any person or group all that
remained was the government, and In his utter Isolation and
loneliness the Individual therefore turned to the state for
personal Identification. The system of denunciation also foster-
ed loyalty to the government In another way. Every office
holder who got his job via the purge of a superior was the
beneficiary of the crimes of the state and In this sense Its
accomplice. This necessitated loyalty to the state to eliminate
one's guilt.
"
The two preceding theories of the function of the purge and
terror are extremely important to an understanding of totali-
tarian government. The first shows very clearly the positive
functions of a process that can appear completely negative.
The second illustrates what happens to an individual under
l^Arendt, p. >>09.
Ik
governmental conditions that demand complete conformity of the
populace. What is disturbing about these two analyses as an
explanation of the motivation behind the purging process is
their neglect of the personal factor. Both agree that the cult
of the leader is an ingredient of totalitarianism, but neither
discuss the personality of the ruler as an important motivation.
That the will of Stalin was law in the Soviet Union is now
certain. Kruschev in his secret speech to the twentieth Party
Congress denouncing Stalin, described how absolute and personal
were his powers of control: "Stalin acted not through persua-
sion, explanation and patient cooperation with people, but by
imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his
will."-1- There is no question that Stalin personally ordered
the Purge and was the mastermind behind the Moscow Trials. Thus
to discuss the purge as one of the needs of totalitarianism
without mentioning the personal motivation of the leader is
somewhat inadequate despite the light it sheds on the system
in general.
A more recent examination of the purge focuses on Stalin's
personality as the motivating force behind the terror. In an
essay introducing the transcript of the last Moscow trial Robert
C. Tucker asserts that Stalin's own needs both personal and
political unleashed the terror. He contends that the trials
were a web of fact and fiction about a great conspiracy resem-
bling "...textbook description of a paranoid delusional
jjjyj j*12l"X1*' *«» Current Soviet Policies . II, (New York,
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system. "^ Refuting the stability via instability argument of
Brzezinskl and Arendt, he describes the purge as instead a wreck-
ing operation that had dire results in view of the loss of key
personnel essential to the preparation of Russia's defenses.
He asserts that Stalin's position was not secure in 193^ in
view of the existence of the Old Bolsheviks and their long stand-
ing habits of criticism, and that this situation coupled with
the dictator's paranoia prompted the elimination of the Old
Guard.
Tucker's theory is substantiated by two former Soviet
officials. Alexander Orlov, a NKVD agent who defected, claimed
that there was no organized opposition in 193 1*, but that the
country was In a turmoil as a result of the horrors of forced
collectivization and industrialization, that even though the
Old Bolsheviks were silent they were merely biding their time
waiting for the Stalin era to pass so they could again assert
their leadership. Stalin, realizing the widespread discontent,
decided to eliminate all his rivals and thereby increase his
personal power. 21 Orlov, who knew the dictator personally,
also discussed Stalin's constant fear of assassination and the
elaborate precautions he took to assure his personal safety, 22
^Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., The Great
Purge Trial . (New York, 1965), p. xxlii.
2 Ibld .. p. xxvii.
21Alexander Orlov. The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes .
(London, 195*), P. «K>-»£
22These Included the wearing of a bullet proof vest during
Red Square parades, keeping the route and day of his departures
from the Kremlin a secret, traveling in a train of armoured steel,
having the road to his villa (35 km. long) guarded day and night
by 1200 men, etc. Ibid . . p. 20.
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a description that lends support to the paranoia idea. Krivitsky,
a former high ranking Soviet intelligence officer also described
the rebellious mood of the population and claimed that this had
affected the rank and file of the party. The only possibility
of leadership for this discontent lay with the Old Bolsheviks
who held the sympathy of the masses. Stalin, impressed by Hitler's
blood purge of June 193>+ decided to forestall any coalescence of
the opposition by eliminating them completely. 23 Krivitsky de-
scribed how Stalin's personal thirst for power resulted in the
elimination of the leadership of both the Army and the party:
The old differences of opinion with the high command
of the Red Army remained in his memory as "opposition".
This "opposition", when dragged into the meshes of his
OGPU machine, became a "conspiracy". Such conspiracies
are the rungs on the ladder on which Stalin climbed to
absolute power. In the process critics became "enemies,"
sincere opponents "traitors", all honest and zealous
oppositional opinion - with the expert aid of the OGPU -
"organized plots". On the corpses of his former comrades
and fellow Revolutionaries, creators and builders of
the Soviet state, Stalin has mounted step by^tep to
solitary control over the peoples of Russia.
Krivitsky 's book supports another theory put forth by Tucker
to explain the purge. The former intelligence officer in 19^0
contended that Stalin as early as 193"+, observing that the Nazi
dictatorship was strengthened by the purge of the SA, decided it
was in Russia's best interest to come to terms with Hitler as
soon as possible. Respecting the Nazi power and Germany's
superiority, Stalin therefore Joined the League and worked for
collective security pacts with the West to strengthen her
23w. G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin '3 Agent . (London, 19^0),
p. 203-205.
2lf
Ibid., p. 26W.
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International position, all to convince Hitler it would be
advantageous for the two dictators to conclude an agreement. 25
Krlvitsky felt that the Red Army, especially officers like
Tukhachevsky, would have objected to an alliance with Hitler,
therefore they had to be eliminated. 2^ Tucker carries this
Idea even further. He felt that Stalin envisioned a sphere of
influence in East Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East as
a result of a treaty with Hitler. Both the Old Bolsheviks and
the Tukhachevsky group were not only anti-Fascist but also anti-
imperialist and, according to Tucker, would never have agreed
to the dictator'3 new line. Stalin therefore needed absolute
power to enforce his policy within Russia and also without to
silence in advance his critics in the Comintern. 27 As evidence
for his views Tucker compares the speeches of Bukharin and
Stalin at the seventeenth Party Congress In 193>+. Bukharin,
the accepted Intellectual leader of the Old Bolsheviks closed
with a warning against Hitler. Stalin In his speech stated
that he did not exclude an agreement with the Nasi Dictator just
because of the Fascist ideology. Tucker further states that
Hitler's successful occupation of the Rhineland In March 1936
strengthened Stalin's resolve that there must be a pact and
thereby led to an intensification of the purge. 28
25Krivitsky, p. 17-20.
26
-£hiil., p. 21+6-2^7.
27Tucker and Cohen, p. xxxiv-xxxvl
.
28
-Ihid., p. xxv-xxxvi.
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It Is Impossible to either completely accept or reject
Tucker's thesis on the prospective German pact as a cause for the
purge. There are little pieces of evidence that seem to support
him. For instance Beck and Godin reported that some prisoners
were discussing this theory, and further stated: "We even met
prisoners who were prophesying the Hitler pact in 1938 simply on
the basis of the 'categories' which had been arrested .
"
29 Witness
also the shock and disbelief that a defector recalled spread
through the Siberian city where he worked when the new foreign
policy line was announced. He stated that Stalin's control was
so absolute that only an instinct for survival caused party
members to ardently support the pact. 30 a lack of concrete facts
increases the temptation to try to read Stalin's mind. He might
have contemplated the German alliance as an alternative, if all
attempts at collective security failed. With his own very
strong instinct for survival and his belief that he alone knew
what was best for Hussia, he would have foreseen the widespread
resistance that might materialize at such a shift in policy and
therefore decided to forestall such opposition. It is credible
29Beck and Godin, p. 198.
3°Victor A. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom . (New York, I9W6).
P. 332-33"+. See also Markoosha Fischer. My Lives In Russia .
(New York, 19MO, p. 2Mt-2>+6. A Russian married to an American
who lived in Moscow from 1927-1939, Mrs. Fischer describes her
gradual disillusionment with the Soviet leadership during the
purge era, but claims the final break in her allegiance came with
the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Her book is a good,
personal description of what life was like in Moscow during
the Great Purge, especially the effect of the terror on friend-
ship and family relationships.
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that at some time between 193W and 1939 part of Stalin's moti-
vation behind the purge of the party was a possible future
agreement with Hitler, but because of the lack of evidence It
Is Impossible to wholeheartedly accept this thesis.
Tucker Is on much stronger ground when he talks about
Stalin's possible paranoia. Many facts support his thesis: the
Irrational nature of the purge Itself, the fact that people were
arrested who could not possibly have been considered dangerous
or even potentially hostile to the leadership, the fact that
Stalin saw treason In every critical remark, the evidence that
after the Old Bolsheviks were eliminated the purge extended to
the young men who had been reared and promoted by the leader him-
self. There are certain explanations for the element of irration-
ality in Its Initiator. The wild story of the Doctor's plot, a
new purge forestalled by Stalin's death, adds great validity to
Tucker's thesis. In reading about the alleged scheme of the
Jewish doctors to poison Stalin, the aura of unreality is strik-
ing. The charges at the public 1936-38 trials were so absurd
that they fit a pattern of Irrationality. The seclusion in which
Stalin lived, the elimination of his closest friends, the suicide
of his wife can all be seen in retrospect as fitting the paranoia
pattern. Again as with the Qerman-pact-theory there are no con-
crete facts, but the amount of circumstantial evidence is suffi-
cient to conclude that Stalin probably had paranoid tendencies,
and that his illness was a significant motivation for the purge.
Unfortunately Tucker's arguments focus almost exclusively
on the era of the Great Purge. He makes no attempt to explain
20
the earlier or later purges of either society or the party. His
paranoia thesis can, of course, be applied to Stalin's entire
reign, but in scoffing at the instability theory he goes too
far. There could be an explanation of the purge as a process
that fits both the needs of totalitarianism and the personality
of the leader.
There is one idea that is found in all the explanations of
the purge but emphasised only by a few. Beck and Godin called
this idea the "Social Prophylaxis" theory and claimed that it
was widespread in the Soviet Onion, especially in NKVD circles.
3
1
This is very simply the concept that to maintain power the to-
talitarian government must eliminate not only the hostile but
also the potentially hostile elements from society. This logi-
cally leads to the Identification of groups which might have a
potentially dangerous, political frame-of-mind , and emphasizes
the need for denunciation to discover the element of dissent.
Thus the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia had to be eliminated
because they were not really supporters of the regime, the
Kulaks and all who fought the collectivisation had to be exter-
minated etc. As to the Old Bolsheviks, a leading scholar, asked
by Beck and Godin why so many Communists were arrested, replied
that Party members had criticized their own government and were
therefore most capable of taking action against it.32 Following
31Beck and Godin, p. 193. See also Jerzy G. Glickman,
"Social Prophylaxis as a Form of Soviet Terror" Totalitarianism .
(Cambridge, Mass., 199*). p. 61 ff.
32Beck and Godin, p. 90.
21
the sane thought but personalizing It, Isaac Deutscher reasoned
that It was necessary for Stalin "...to destroy the men who
represented the potentiality of alternative government, perhaps
not of one but of several alternative governments. "33 Explain-
ing the number of victims, he claimed that once those capable of
forming another government were eliminated, their associates and
subordinates had to be Included because of their potential for
vengeance. 3^ Deutscher 's emphasis is therefore on prevention
in the era of the Great Purge, whereas "Social Prophylaxis"
focuses on prevention In the total picture.
In essence the social prophylaxis theory describes a new
kind of treason. Historically treason has been defined as be-
trayal of the state by one of its citizens. Under the totali-
tarian concept, the individual is guilty before the act, guilty
of being capable of treason, guilty of being a member of a group
that is potentially hostile to the state. Many analysts have
described totalitarianism as a unique system of government based
on a monopoly of physical force used to perpetuate power, and
made possible by modern technology. 35 within this relatively
new form of government traditional definitions and terminology
often lose their validity. 3° Obviously most of the people
33isaac Deutscher, Stalin . (Hew York, 19^9), p. 375.
3>t Ibld .. p. 380.
3
-George >. Kennan, "Totalitarianism in the Modern World"
Totalitarianism
. (Cambridge, Mass., 195M, p. 20-22. See also
the other essays and comments in this collection for a discussion
of totalitarianism's uniqueness.
3 Tucker, discusses for Instance the Aesopian language of
the Old Bolsheviks. He claims that Bukharin used this symbolic
language to Indict Stalin In the final, public purge trial.
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convicted during the Great Purge were not guilty of treason
traditionally defined even in the broadest sentence, but they
were forced to confess and were convicted of activity hostile
to the state. This is equally true for the other purges even
when there was no trial in the legal sense. As long as the
leadership represented either by an individual or an oligarchy
is presumed to be infallible, its word is law and any deviation
from its principles either actual or potential is treason. The
degree of guilt, and thereby the penalty for the crime, varies
with the degree of security felt by the leadership which in
turn depends on the nature of the groups within the society in
so far as they exist. Once the pre-revolutlonary elements and
the opposition within the party had been eliminated from Soviet
life, terror logically abated because the goal of absolute
loyalty and conformity had been reached. As a principle, how-
ever, the totalitarian definition of treason had not disappeared
and it reappeared in the post war era37 and again in the power
struggle after Stalin's death.
This concept of totalitarian treason while it cannot
answer all the questions on the purge is particularly useful
because it fits all phases of the Soviet terror. The intelli-
gentsia and the Kulaks were eliminated because they would
3
'During the war, controls were greatly relaxed and the idea
grew among many Russians that the result of their sacrifice would
be a more democratic government after the Germans were defeated.
To dispel this idea and to restore his absolute power, Stalin
inaugurated another purge which eliminated all those who had had
contact with democratic West and thereby forestalled any in-
cipient opposition to his regime.
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naturally oppose the policy of the leadership, In the one
Instance because the regime had decided to dedicate Itself to
the goal of Industrialization whatever the cost, and In the
other case because the leadership decided on forced collec-
tivization. In both cases the hardships Involved were to be so
severe that only a dedicated Communist committed to socialist
progress could willingly acqulese. By the same logic, the Old
Guard would oppose the cult of the leader as a violation of
basic Marxist-Leninist principles, the German alliance, and in
some cases Socialism in One Country and the rapid pace of
industrialization-collectivization. In a more general way the
concept of totalitarian treason fits the needs of the system
as well as the personality of the leadership. Totalitarianism
itself Is necessarily paranoid, but the degree of Its suspicion
depends to a great extent on the leader. This explains the
different intensity of the terror and is useful In understanding
whatever the future may bring. Totalitarianism will always have
to eliminate the discontented from its hierarchal structure,
though the form and the degree of this elimination will depend
on the top echelon. A change in leadership or strategy will
necessitate a shift in personnel throughout the administrative
apparatus, but as long as the security of the top Is not threat-
ened by real or potential enemies, there is no necessity for
widespread terror. As long as the Soviet Union develops in an
evolutionary way, free from radical change, a high degree of
conformity is assured. However, should a drastic shift In policy
occur or should a new leader with the paranoid tendencies of
Stalin triumph, the concept of potential treason and the terror
that is implicit in it can be reactivated.
NAZI TERROR
The Western world has witnessed in the twentieth century
another government which because of its totalitarian nature,
invites comparison with Stalinist Russia. Germany under the
Nazi regime was characterized by a leadership system that was
absolute in its control over the populace. Terror, through the
secret police and the methods implicit in such an organization,
were a recognized policy of the government. Nazi totalitarian-
ism was of course unique, but because of its similarity to the
Soviet regime in its methods of control of the populace, its
tactics and history require examination. Particularly worth
examination are the theories formulated about Soviet totalitari-
anism to determine whether they have any validity when applied to
a similarly governed society.
Violence was associated with the Nazi movement from its
very beginning. The Storm Troopers or SA which had its origin
in the post World War I Frelkorps were initially a private
police force or auxilliary army to the Party and were associated
with street brawls, gang beatings, etc. As might be expected in
such a group, its members consisted of misfits of all descriptions.
Criminals, ex-convicts, former soldiers unemployed because of the
terms at Versailles, perverts, malcontents and fanatics seeking
a new revolution that would restore German prestige, swelled its
ranks. From the beginning the SA bands or troops were anarchical
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in nature, clearly outside the law with terror and violence
their avowed purpose. They were not so much a bodyguard or
protective squad (this was to come later with the formation of
the SS), but gangs designed to terrorize the opposition, to
break up rival group meetings and to attract attention to their
party and their leader. 1 Temporarily eclipsed during Hitler's
term In prison and successfully outlawed when the Weimar Republic
for a time succeeded In bringing some degree of stability to the
state in the pre-depression years, the 3A again became prominent
In the early thirties and during the election campaigns of 1932-
33 numbered around V00,000. Its function was the same: as before
it marched In parades in the familiar brown shirts, it shouted
praise to Its leader, roving bands sought out known members of
the opposition especially Communists, and larger groups broke up
rallies of rival political parties. To the people it represented
violence and the threat of revolution, but privately Hitler had
decided after the failure of the Munich Putsch (1923) that while
the threat of violence might be effective for blackmail purposes,
he would rise to power by legal means.
The importance of the 3A was thus the image it presented
to Germany and the world of the movement it represented. Vio-
lence was a positive force, repellent to many but attractive to
others. It identified the movement for exactly what it was and
gave a clear picture of what such a party would represent once
it gained power. For the Nazi philosophy was nihilistic in its
xAlan Bullock, Hitler. A Study In Tyranny . (New York, 196W),
P. 72.
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belief, respecting violence for its own sake, for the results it
attained in terms of power as well as its curative, cleansing
affect. Commenting on this aspect of his movement Hitler was
quoted as saying, "Brutality is respected. Brutality and physi-
cal strength. . .The people need wholesome fear. They want to
fear something. They want someone to frighten them and make
them shudderingly submissive."2 And on another occasion the
Fuhrer was reputed to have said, "I must drown Germany's enemies
in a wave of terror, so that they may not bring the Reich to
ruin with their humanitarian slogans. "3 Outward, physical
violence through the SA was the method of terror employed by
the Nazis before their assumption of power. Once Hitler became
Chancellor and had an opportunity to solidify his control, the
situation changed. The SS became the instrument of fear, the
network of concentration camps appeared, and the use of terror
to control the populace became the policy of the government.
Bureaucratized terror represented by the SS thereafter replaced
the anarchical type of terror represented by the SA.
The SS was organized in 1922 as a private bodyguard, a
small elite group, whose loyalty to the leader was to be absolute.
In contrast to the SA it remained small and was nominally under
the control of the Brown Shirts until 1931*. In 1929 Himmler
2Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction
.
(New York,
191*0), p. 82-83.
3&irt Kreuger M.D. , Inside Hitler . (New York, 19>+1), p. 298.
^Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation . (New York,
1957), p. 13.
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became its chief to be Joined two years later by Heydrieh who
organized the SD, the intelligence unit of the party. In 1933
after Hitler became Chancellor Heydrieh and Himmler, working
from Munich, gradually gained control of the provincial police
and in 1936 were finally given complete authority over all the
enforcement agencies in the Reich. In 1933 Goering as Prussian
Minister of the Interior had assumed control of the Berlin
political police which had existed since 1919, and from this
unit the Gestapo or Secret Police evolved. 5 with the ascendency
of the SS in 193*+ the Gestapo gradually came under its control.
The administrative bureacracy of Nazi Germany was complicated,
but by and large it was the SD who spied on the party and the
populace, both operating through a network of informers.
There was never any question of legality as far as the
Secret Police were concerned. Himmler was responsible only to
the Fuhrer and acts of the Gestapo were considered beyond the
law. As early as March 23, 1933 in a speech to the Reichstag
Hitler explained his philosophy. There was to be equality be-
fore the law only to those who supported the government. ^ under
the theory of "protective custody" (a term for detention in a
concentration camp) punishment would come to any who committed
acts counter to the "sound feeling of the people", or what the
people should feel if they were convinced National Socialists. 7
'Charles Wighton, Heydrieh: Hitler's Most Svll Henchman .(London, 1962), p. 38. —
William Ebenstein, The Nazi State. (New York, 19»*3), P. 69-70.
Tlbid,., p. 73-7>f.
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Therefore individuals were incarcerated to "protect" them from
the righteous wrath of the citizenry. Unlike their Soviet
counterpart who kept the sham of legality by their insistence
on confession and trial, the German Secret Police rarely tried
anyone, and while they might Interrogate victims for Information,
they were generally unconcerned with the guilt or innocence of
the individual. This type of Justice Is of course essential
under the concept of totalitarian treason where the individual
Is presumed to be a potential enemy of the state merely by his
group Identification.
Both the theory of social prophylaxis and totalitarian
treason discussed in relation to the Soviet terror apply equally
well to the German situation. The principle function of the
Gestapo was to Identify and arrest potential enemies of the
state before they became active enough to pose a threat to the
leadership." Certain groups were the enemy merely by definition.
Communists were publicly identified as the opposition at the
time of the Reichstag fire, leaders of the Social Demoeractic
party were arrested shortly thereafter, and by the summer of
1933 only the Nazi party was legal. Hoess, Commandant of Ausch-
witz, explained why Jehovah Witnesses were "guilty". He said
that enemies of Germany were using them and their beliefs to
undermine military morale. ^ Gypsies were biologically Inferior
and like the Jews were weakening the master race with an Infusion
^Edward Crankshaw, Gestapo . (London, 1956), p. 113.
^Hudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz . (Cleveland and New
York, 1959), p. 97.
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of their blood. In the case of the Jews there was in addition
the "international marxist Jewish conspiracy" which aimed at
the destruction of the natural, superior strength of the German
people who were the only ones fit to rule. In addition to these
categories of enemies there were individuals such as church
leaders, educators, and scientists who were detained or forced
to emigrate because of their opposition.
It is relatively easy to understand in the case of these
latter victims why they were persecuted since they were openly
in opposition to the Nazi regime. As for the Communists and
Social Democratic leaders the social prophylaxis theory is
applicable. Potentially they were a threat to the regime, and
a totalitarian government to insure its survival must eliminate
the possibility of opposition. The Jewish situation, however,
was quite different. The Jews were a threat not in a real sense
but only in an imagined one. No matter how irrational the
Protocols might seem, the fact is that Hitler believed in an
international Jewish conspiracy. There is no way of determining
whether he first hated Jews because of some childhood experience
with Freudian overtones as Dr. Kreuger suggests10 and then dis-
covered the conspiracy idea, or whether he first sensed the need
of an identifiable enemy to rationalise Germany's plight and
consequently utilised his own anti-Semitic feelings, which
coincided with the inclinations of his people, in the choice of
a scapegoat. Whatever the origins of his emotion it is easily
10Kreuger, passim.
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understood how, with a personality like the Fuhrer's, hatred of
the Jews could be intensified until It reached the proportions
that led to the Final Solution. Dr. Kreuger described Hitler's
condition In more scientific terms: "The psychopath, with a
paranoid mentality like that of my patient, needs the crutch
of a devastating and continual hatred upon which to lean, and
to use as a bludgeon against a world of Imaginary enemies I"11
Others in the movement were probably not Impressed with the
conspiracy idea, but the identification of an enemy is a useful
weapon in a totalitarian society, and the Jews were a logical
choice in a country where the roots of anti-Semitism ran deep.
Thus, while on the surface, the social prophylaxis theory does
not seem to apply to the identification of the Jews as the
enemy, in reality it does. The leadership principle was para-
mount, the leader was convinced that the Jews represented a
conspiracy against the rightful ascendency of the German people,
therefore, they were a threat that had to be eliminated.
The campaign directed against the Jewish people - the
economic reprisals, the boycotts, the arm bands, the isolation
and finally the concentration and extermination camps - can
obviously be called terror. Many have commented on the meekness
with which the Jews went to their deaths in the gas chambers,
but actually they had been so terrorized before the decision
for extermination at Wannsee in 19^2 that their sheeplike be-
havior might almost have been anticipated. This particular
^Kreuger, p. ^36.
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subject has been a controversial one since the publication of
Hannah Arendt's book Blchmann In Jerusalem . Her reference to
the docile behavior of the Jews and particularly the role of
their own leadership In their extermination led to unwarranted
assumptions about her position, which was simply that to raise
the question of their lack of self defense was cruel and be-
trayed an ignorance of camp conditions In Germany. 12 While her
explanation is somewhat inadequate, it in no way implies a
fatal weakness inherent in the Jewish people. Bruno Betelhelm's
psychological explanation is more revealing. He contended that
the guards had so depersonalized the trip to the gas chamber
and their treatment of the victims that they could not have
responded in any other way. 1^ The implication is, of course,
that any people under similar circumstances would have reacted
in a similar way. Polish prisoners in The Dark Side of the Moon1^
evidenced a similar lack of response, and the eagerness with
which Russian prisoners strived to manufacture acceptable con-
fessions indicates that totalitarian police methods successfully
remove all traces of human dignity from their victims. Jewish
behavior in the extermination camps merely indicates that the
terror campaign against them had been successful.
Defining terror as a government policy designed to promote
fear in a part or all of the populace clearly puts the campaign
12New York, 1963, p. 283.
13The Informed Heart . (Glencoe, Illinois, 1966), p. 2W8-250.
^Anon., (London, 191»-6).
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of 1933-^2 against the Jews in this category. But could the
genocide that subsequently occurred be considered a purge In the
sense of the Russian phenomenon of the thirties? If purge Is
defined as one aspect of terror and Interpreted as a government's
attempt to cleanse society of an alien element that Is harmful
either immediately or potentially to Its vitality or growth,
then the term clearly applies to the program against the Jews.
The leadership was convinced that Jewish blood sapped the vital-
ity of Aryan Germany and Its elimination was therefore a purg-
ative for society. The situation Is somewhat analogous to the
extermination of the Kulaks In the early thirties In Russia, who
were "removed" from society not only because they were potentially
a threat to the leadership, but also because they represented an
element that was foreign to a collective society. There was
however a unique element to the Nazi racial policy, which was
designed to promote a racial Utopia. The SS in particular had
plans for breeding a racial elite which would begin with the
extermination of Jewry to be followed by the Slavs and other
biologically inferior groups.
German society was therefore In the eyes of the Nazis clean-
sed by the removal of the Jews as well as the extermination of
the gypsies, the mentally 111, and the feeble minded. The party
Itself was purged on only one spectacular occasion, The Night of
the Long Knives." By June 1931* the SA and Its leader, Ernst
l?The extermination of the opposition following the 19M+
attempt on Hitler's life does not apply to this discussion since
it was clearly an attempt to eliminate a group of traitors (De-
fined in the traditional sense of the word) and therefore has no
connection to totalitarian terror, which is designed to forestall
any grouping together of dissident elements.
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Roehm, were becoming restive. It appeared that the revolution
was over. The leader had become Chancellor of Germany, Nazis
were now In key positions throughout the Reich, the opposition
had been outlawed and virtually silenced. But thus far there
was no established position for this huge private army. It was
no longer necessary to publicly extoll the leader or terrorise
the opposition - the SA had virtually become obsolete In the
Hew Order unless it could find a new function. Its leader, a
former army officer, wanted to Incorporate his troop Into the
Relchswehr with himself in a leadership position. Furthermore,
the radical wing of the party representing, in the name of Qregor
Strasser, the more socialist alms of the movement had a following
In the SA. This element was seeking a second revolution that
would lead to greater benefits for the worker and a more egali-
tarian society. In direct opposition to Roehm and the SA was
the Army and the Nasi party represented by Ceorlng, Ooebbels,
Hess, Hlmmler and Heydrlch. 10 The Oerman Army with its tradi-
tions of honor and respectability wanted no part of this rowdy,
criminal group and its perverted leader, and Hitler needed the
Army's support not only for his long range foreign policy plans,
but also for his scheme to replace Hlndenburg as President as
soon as the old man died. Moreover the Fuhrer had little Inter-
est in the socialist views of Gregor Strasser, his major ob-
jective was always the realization and consolidation of power.
The Nazi party feared the SA because It had no control over
^Hermann Hau and Helmut Krausnick, German History. 19^-t» 1? .
(New York, 1963), p. *+9.
Its actions, and if it were allowed to merge with the Army Roehm
would automatically assume the stature of a dangerous rival.
Therefore on June 30, 1931*, on the pretext that Roehm was at-
tempting a Putsch, the Nazi movement was purged of its dissident
elements by the murder of the SA and Socialist leaders.
Friedrlch and Brzezinskl in their excellent work on totali-
tarianism do not regard the Night of the Long Knives as a purge
in the Soviet sense. They base their conclusion on the thesis
that the Soviet process had by the thirties, become an insti-
tltionalized aspect of totalitarian society, highly organized
and systematized, bearing little resemblance to the hurried and
violent act of the Nazis. They feel, moreover, that since the
purge is a necessary phenomenon in totalitarian society, that in
both the German and Italian parties, with a further evolution of
society and a change in leadership, the purge would have become
an institution in the Russian sense. »» While their conclusions
have validity, they overlook some of the similarities between
the Roehm and Stalinist purges. In each case the opposition was
potentially a threat to the leadership, and furthermore in each
party there was definitely a dissident element. In Germany there
was the radical, socialist element and in Russia the followers
of Trotsky in the early stages, Bukharin in the later phase. In
both cases the people eliminated had been loyal party members
from the beginning of the movement. The German purge necessitated
quick violence, because Hitler was not as tightly in control of
17Mau and Krausnick, p. 151-152.
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the country as was Stalin by the mid-thirties. Moreover Roehm
had an army under his command which precluded a public arrest
and trial. The situation is analogous, In this respect, to the
secret trial and execution of Tukachevsky. In both cases the
leader's personal Instinct for survival was greater than the
need for public, legal Justification of his acts.
Another area that must be considered in comparing the Roehm
Purge and Nazi terror in general to the Stalinist era is the
personality of the leader. While there is still some question
about Stalin's paranoia, there can be little concerning Hitler's.
It is evident in his identification of enemies both internal
and external, in his increasing isolation from society (particu-
larly Intensified after the outbreak of war), his well known
rages, his insistence on absolute loyalty and obedience to
himself, and especially by the use of terror tactics as a
deterrent for disloyalty. Privately Hitler admitted that the
concentration camps and especially the cruelty associated with
them had a deterrent value I
Terror is the most effective political instrument.
The important thing is the sudden shock of an over-
whelming fear of death. Why should I use different
measures against my Internal political opponents?
The so-called atrocities spare me a hundred thousand
individual actions against disobedience and discon-
tent. People will think twice before opposing us
when they hear what to expect in the camps. 1
™
Totalitarianism, as mentioned above, is necessarily paranoid.
Any latent opposition must be forestalled. The system of terror,
the existence of a secret police are based on the premise that
l8Rauschning, p. 83.
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a significant portion of the population are not supporters of
the leadership. However, the extent of the violence must depend
to a great extent on the fears of the leader. It is impossible
when reading accounts of individuals who were personally ac-
quainted with Hitler to ignore the fact that the Fuhrer was a
psychopath with frequent fits of paranoia. Even his own writ-
ings, his speeches, and actions betray this dangerous malady.
The violence of the movement, the Nazi ideology, the cruelty
of the camps were all manifestations of Hitler's paranoid per-
sonality. In Stalin's ease the evidence Is not as obvious, but
is sufficient to conclude that his personality was a significant
factor motivating the terror of the thirties and post war
years.^
It is in this connection that all theories dealing with
terror and/or purge as a necessity in totalitarian government
are weakest. Present day conditions in the Soviet Union show
quite clearly exactly how significant was Stalin's personality
to the terror of the thirties and post war years. It seems
quite probable that had Stalin not been successful in his bid
for power following Lenin's death, the Russian people might have
been spared the horror of the thirties, and the government
might have evolved in a more Social Democratic way. u In
^9At the present date it appears that Svetlana's memoirs
will confirm her father's paranoia and its increasing manifes-
tation from the suicide of her mother in 1932.
^Walter Laquer, Russia and Germany . (London, 1965). ch. 13.
Laquer objects to Deutscher's view of Stalin as a "great revo-
lutionary despot."
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Germany, however, the situation was quite different. The ide-
ology was nihilistic, violence and terror were not only functional
but also curative. One of the purposes behind the sadism in the
camps was the education of the SS, the premise being that human-
ltarlanism was a weakness in the Aryan race that was fostered by
contact with aliens such as Jews or Slavs. Thus, the Ideology
was a reflection of the leader's psychosis, an insanity he
shared with the top echelon of the Nazi movement. In Russia the
terror logically abated with the death of Stalin (following the
liquidation of his key henchmen), while in Germany It would
have continued as long as the Nazi ideology held sway. The in-
dications were that the next group to be exterminated would be
the Poles, 21 followed no doubt by the entire Slav world. The
Brzezinski thesis on the permanence of the purge under totali-
tarianism alleges that the cleansing process can exist without
terror, in other words that there can be a peaceful turnover
of leadership with a corresponding administrative shake-up.
However, If the purge is non-violent how does it differ from the
bureacratlc changeover In a democracy that follows the defeat
of the party in power? Under this broad definition the purge
cannot be considered solely a characteristic of totalitarianism.
The atomlzatlon theory that asserts that the terror is de-
signed to Isolate individuals to preclude any grouping together
of hostile elements, appears to fit Nazi totalitarianism as well
as the Russian. The agent provocateur was a well known tool of
21Arendt, Origins , p. U21+.
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Heydrich who was notorious for his "files" which contained a dos-
sier on each prominent official in the Third Reich. Equally well
known was the system of Block Wardens established among the pop-
ulace for the purpose of spying, plus the instruction to children
via the Hitler Youth to report their parents for disloyalty to
the leadership. The evidence Indicates, however, that despite
these measures the Isolation of individuals was not as extreme
as might be expected. With the exception of the Jews and other
groups that were specifically designated as the enemy, the popu-
lace was not particularly terrorized. The Indications are that
an Individual who either supported the regime or kept his opposi-
tion silent could feel relatively secure. 22 Initially Hitler
found widespread support or at least acquiescence among the people.
The average person Interested in his own, private world saw living
conditions improve after the Nazi takeover. As one of them said,
"There were Jobs and job security, summer camps for the children
and the Hitler Jugend to keep them off the streets... Nobody went
hungry, nobody went ill and uncared for."23 Those who were not
directly involved in the persecution of Jews or Communists could
feel grateful that it was someone else who was being victimized
and live secure in the knowledge that if they pursued their own
lives and did not try to Interfere with the state, they would be
safe. 2^ The situation was comparable to the NEP period in Russia
22Mllton S. Mayer, They Thought Thev Were Free . (Chicago,
1955), P. 57
23lbid.
, p. h8.
2l+
Mayer, p. 57-58
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when the Intelligentsia and even the Kulaks could live in peace
as long as they did not directly oppose the regime. There were,
of course, Germans in the thirties who because of their race,
politics, or profession were antagonistic to the new ideology,
and these were forced to emigrate, suffer increasing persecution.
In 1939 with the outbreak of hostilities many Germans be-
came disillusioned with the leadership, but propaganda about the
penalty for opposition was widespread enough to forestall any
outward manifestation of discontent. Furthermore the war and
particularly the early victories made opposition seem unpatriotic.
As might be expected controls tightened during wartime, yet even
with the closer surveillance several underground, opposition
groups organized, some of whose members had close contact with
the Nazi hierarchy. With the degree of atomizatton in Soviet
Russia, a conspiracy of this type was virtually impossible.
Isaac Deutscher asserts that the leaders of the Red Army led by
Tukhachevsky planned a coup d'etat, that the plot was discovered
by the secret police who smashed it with the arrest and execu-
tion of its leaders. 25 There is, however, no solid evidence
that warrants acceptance of this allegation. 20 Deutscher cites
Krivitsky, but the former Russian agent stated that the Army
conspiracy was a product of Stalin's imagination. 2? Schellenburg
who, with Heydrlch, furnished the forged German documents that
25stalin, p. 379-380.
2oTucker and Cohen, xxiv, fn. 13.
27Krivitsky, p. 2k6.
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were used to convict the Tukhachevsky group of collaboration with
the German Army, stated merely that Heydrlch believed the accu-
sations but had no proof of their validity. 2" The strongest
evidence against the plot is the nature of the terror Itself.
Conditions being what they were, with the Secret Police every-
where, with its representatives watching not only the Old Bolshe-
viks but also the Army, It seems incredible that a coup d'etat
could even have reached the planning state. 2'
Further evidence that atomlzation was not as successful in
Germany as it was in Russia was the institutional structure of
the Third Reich. Left Intact after the Nasi takeover were two
major groups, the Church and the Army. Initially these groups,
at least outwardly, supported the Nazi revolution, yet even
when a few of their leaders were suppressed for public oppos-
ition, the structure of the institution remained intact. More-
over, the property classes were not dispossessed, but were
instead used in building the new order. With the increased
prosperity brought about by rearmament the wealthy had good reason
to be grateful and dependent on the state for future favors. 3°
This situation differed markedly from the Soviet one. By the
end of the Civil War Russia was in total chaos. The Church as
an Institution had withered away, the propertied classes had
lost their wealth, the Army had been organised by the Bolsheviks
2°Walter Schellenberg , The Schellenbare Memoirs . (London,
1956), p. i*6-»*9.
29Krivitsky, passim.
3"Rauschning, p. 161.
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and was under their control. Social, economic and political
life had completely disintegrated. There was considerable re-
laxation under NEP, but when the terror was gradually Intensi-
fied in the thirties there were no groups left from the pre-war
period that might offer the individual a refuge outside the
state. Furthermore, there Is no indication that the system of
denunciation in Nazi Germany was as successful as the one in the
Soviet Union. There was one important difference in the two
systems. Denunciations were required in Russia and merely en-
couraged under the Nazis. When reading the memoirs of the vic-
tims of the Gestapo it is common to find that the individual was
arrested for racial or political reasons or because the Secret
Police spies uncovered evidence against the person, but rarely
does the writer claim denunciation by another citizen or victim.
This is quite different from what occurred in the Soviet Union
where a woman whose husband was arrested quickly denounced him
to try to protect herself and her children, usually to no avail.
Mrs. Fischer recorded that she was unable to betray her emotions
to her children because they were so Indoctrinated that they
would report her. This differs from the German couple in Brecht's
"The Informer" who feared that their son would denounce them,
but were not convinced of his betrayal. According to Mrs. Fischer
individuals in Moscow were so isolated that they dared neither
visit or telephone old and trusted friends. Furthermore the
Harvard study on the World War II Russian refugees discovered
the "almost universal belief that no one, explicitly including
the party people, was free from the threat of the NKVD and
h2
its personnel. "31 It is quite possible that terror might have
reached such proportions in Germany had the Nazis not gone to
war thereby insuring their own destruction. It appears probable
that Hitler would eventually have moved against the Church,
perhaps supplanted the Army bytthe Waffen SS, continued the
program of extermination until it touched a greater proportion
of the populace, but as it was, terror in general never reached
the extremes In Nazi Germany that it did during the Great Purge
in Russia.
Interestingly the opposite was true within the concentra-
tion or forced labor camps of the two countries. The sadism
and deliberate brutality of the German camps was not found in
their Soviet counterpart, although the foroed labor system made
life grim and hardly bearable. Miss Arendt has characterized
the former as Hell and the latter as Purgatory32 and the descrip-
tion is fitting though the differences between the two are worth
noting. Polish prisoners recording their experiences in The
Dark Side of the Moon33 reported that while their guards seemed
immune to their suffering, they were not deliberately cruel,
and this was confirmed by Mre. Buber-Neumann who was a survivor
of camps of both systems. 3^ The sadistic brutality of the German
31Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen .
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 333.
32Arendt, Origins , p. M>5.
33Anon. (London, 19^6), passim.
3^Margarete Buber, Under Two Dictators
.
(New York, n.d.),
passim. See also Solzhenltsy, for the Soviet side, One Day In
the Life of Ivan Denlsovlch
.
(New v rk, 1963).
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camps is well known, as are the gas chambers, the Einsatzgruppen,
and the millions of dead, but the effect of the camp system on
the prisoners is also worth noting for comparative purposes.
Bettelheim, a psychoanalyst who was an inmate of Buchenwald for
approximately one year, concluded that in order to survive the
experience inmates had to undergo a radical personality change.
The traditional middle class values were an insufficient defense
against the brutality, and the men who stayed alive in the German
camps often became replicas of their guards in their personality
traits. 35 No such study of Russian forced labor camps was under-
taken, but the absence of deliberate brutality in the Soviet
system suggests while the inmates must have found it difficult
to adjust to the harsh living conditions, their personalities
and values need not have undergone the drastic change of their
German counterpart. Differences in the work system are also
worth noting. While the Soviets learned that forced labor was
inefficient, at least prisoners were engaged in productive em-
ployment. Ivan Denisovich could take pride in the wall he was
building, while his German counterpart might be ordered to build
a wall and on its completion to tear it down. During the war
Slavic prisoners were used to some extent as slave labor, but
within the camps this was generally not the case.
Comparison of two such penal systems can be misleading,
because it may appear to be an attempt to whitewash one or the
other. Life in the Soviet camps, while not as brutalized as
35Bettelheim, passim.
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existence in its German counterpart, was, nevertheless, extreme-
ly severe. Conditions were primitive, disease was common, food
was scarce, winters were unbearably cold without the proper
clothing - in short, one had to be physically strong to survive.
Most of these conditions existed in Germany, but added to these,
was the dehumanization process practiced by the guards. Ivan
Denisovich retained some of the dignity of a human being, but
under the SS a man often became as defficient in humanitarianism
as his oppressors.
SCME COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS
In comparing two totalitarian terror systems, certain
generalizations are inescapable. Basic to both, are certain
principles, namely that the leader is Infallible, his will is
law, and his survival (which is deemed to be a positive good)
depends on the loyalty and conformity of the mass. Terror and
purge are methods of insuring this conformity, and were largely
successful in both the German and Soviet systems. Both required
a secret police network to carry out the policy of the govern-
ment and in both cases this agency was relatively autonomous,
free from the restraint of law, and responsible only to the
leadership. Analysis further reveals the significance of the
individual leaders. Both Stalin and Hitler were paranoid, and
this personality defect greatly influenced the degree of violence
and repression within the terror system. Naziism was Hitlerism,
and it is doubtful whether the movement would ever have gained
power without his leadership or survived his death. Stalin was
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less essential to Communism in Russia since Bolshevism was al-
ready established when he assumed the leadership, but it is
questionable whether the Soviet Union would have evolved into
the terror-ridden, authoritarian system of the thirties without
his ruthless control.
Despite the common characteristics of the two systems,
there were basic differences in Nazi Germany and Stalinist
Russia that comparison tends to emphasize. The ideologies were
obviously antagonistic. In Germany the creed was negative,
nihilistic. The Nazi revolution could only move Germany back-
ward because of the complete irrationality of the racist views.
Moreover its commitment to "living space" in the East meant that
its destruction was inevitable. The Communist ideology promised
increased benefits for the masses no matter how tortuous the
impliraentations of policy might be. Stalin, despite his twisted
personality, was unable and unwilling to ruin Russia (e.g. the
Great Purge ended in 1938) to a great extent because he was com-
mitted to a progressive ideology. With his death terror logi-
cally abated, but in Germany, because of the ideology, it would
have continued as long as the Nazis held power.
As far as the terror itself was concerned, conditions were
much worse in Russia than in Germany. Brzezinski's conclusion
that the two totalitarian countries differed in their stages of
development is a partial explanation for this disparity. No
doubt conditions would have worsened in Germany had Hitler's
foreign policy been successful, but it is likely that had Hitler
died, instead of a party power struggle developing in Germany as
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it did in Russia when Lenin died, the Nazi regime would have
collapsed and a much wider struggle for the spoils with other
political groups participating would have ensued. Another, more
significant explanation for the difference in the terror is the
amount of support each ruler enjoyed. Hitler was acceptable to
the majority of the German people, but, more important, he was
revered by his immediate entourage. There can be no question
about the allegiance of Hlmmler, Goering, Bormann and Goebbels,
whereas Stalin had reason for questioning the support of the Old
Bolsheviks. There was no conspiracy in Russia as the prosecution
alleged at the public purge trials, but the revolutionary group
represented the possibility of an alternative leadership which
had no counterpart in the Nazi top echelon. In both countries
certain groups such as the Jews, the Kulaks, the Tsarist aris-
tocracy etc. were by definition of the ideology the enemy, but
only In Russia was there a group among the elite who represented
a threat to the leadership. This situation, intensified by
Stalin's paranoia and the natural, snowballing affect of a
system of terror based on denunciation, helps explain the differ-
ences in the degree of repression in the two countries.
Among the theories concerning totalitarian terror discussed
above, only one applies equally well to both systems. Under the
definition of totalitarian treason an individual is guilty if
potentially he is a threat to the leadership, either through
his conscience or his association with others. This is the
only theory broad enough to encompass the two dictatorships and
still allow for the uniqueness of each. This type of formulation
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is useful to an understanding of the irrational rule by fear,
but it must allow for the limitations of specific, historical
circumstance. The differences between the two totalitarian
regimes are significant enough to limit the validity of any
generalization. The whole concept of totalitarianism though
descriptively useful at the time it was formulated, is becoming
obsolete, largely because it was created primarily to describe
the government of the Soviet Union which, since Stalin's death,
has undergone great change. Thus, theoretical formulations are
useful if they are examined in the harsh light of historical
reality.
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Under twentieth century totalitarianism, the traditional
definition of treason lost Its relevance. An Individual became
a traitor not by an act of disloyalty, but simply by definition
of the Infallible leadership, either by arbitrary definition or
by membership in a group defined by the ruling elite as hostile
or potentially hostile to the state. This new Interpretation of
treason was the theoretical basis for the system of terror found
in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.
Several theories have been formulated to explain totalitar-
ian terror focusing generally on the Great Purge in the Soviet
Union. One set, generalising from the specific circumstances of
the Russian situation, explains the elimination process as essen-
tial to the stability of totalitarian regimes. The overall
validity of theories of this type is weakened when the Soviet
terror is compared to the Nazi process or to conditions in post
Stalinist Russia. The purging of the ruling elite in the Soviet
Union is better explained by specific, historical circumstances,
especially the existence of a group (the Old Bolsheviks) who were
a potential alternative to the personal leadership of Stalin
combined with the paranoid personality of the dictator. There
was no comparable purging process in Nazi Germany, only the
spectacular Night of the Long Knives (June 1931*) when the dissi-
dent element of the Nazi party was exterminated. Moreover, present
day Soviet totalitarianism utilizes alternative methods to control
the populace. Therefore the purging porcess and the terror
implicit in It, is not a necessary aspect of totalitarianism,
although It can be a useful tool of the leadership.
The atomization of society through terror to forestall any
grouping together of dissident elements was used In both Nasi
Germany and the Soviet Union, but was far more successful In
Russia, again because of historical circumstances. Indications
are that the average German was not nearly as Isolated as his
Russian counterpart, that Institutions euch as the Army and the
Church were left Intact, that the ordinary non-Jewish citizen was
secure provided he did not actively oppose the regime. At the
height of the Great Purge in Russia, on the other hand, personal
life became disorganized, relationships were imperilled, families
were disrupted. Therefore as a theory explaining totalitarian
terror, the atomization theory Is useful If considered within a
unique historical situation.
In Nazi Germany the character and extent of the terror is
best explained by the personality of the ruler and the basic
tenets of the Ideology. (For instance, the Jews were exterminated
because they represented an element alien to the goal of an Aryan
Germany. ) Since the ideology was anti-humanitarian and geared to
the purification of the race, terror against certain groups within
the populace of both Germany and its area of control would have
continued as long as the Nazis held power. In Russia terror
logically abated with the death of the paranoid leader and was
even restrained to a certain extent during his lifetime by his
commitment to a progressive ideology. Therefore, although
conditions for the individual were decidedly worse In the Soviet
Union than in Nazi Germany, the Russian terror ended, while the
Nazi Ideology promised a wider system of elimination with the
passage of time.
Although generalizations about totalitarian terror are use-
ful in understanding a process that seems totally irrational,
they must be limited by historical circumstances, while super-
ficially the German and Russian system of terror appear to have
been quite similar, there were differences basic enough to
limit the validity of any generalizations explaining terror
under totalitarianism.
